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THE EUROPEAN UNION  AND THE SEPTEMBER 11
th CRISIS
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
October 7, 2001 
 
IN LONDON  
Blair Says Britain Taking Part in Attack 
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 
Filed at 7:23 p.m. ET 
LONDON (AP) -- Britain kept its promise to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States 
against terrorism, adding its firepower to the first wave of attacks Sunday against Afghanistan. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, speaking live on television, announced that British missile-firing 
submarines joined the operation. 
 
 
 
 
Minutes after the Sunday, October 7
th, announcement of the U.S.-led actions against 
objectives in Afghanistan, Europe’s most visible face was the one offered by UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair.
1 It was his “finest hour”
2 since the beginning of the crisis on 
September 11, and his attendance at a joint session of the U.S. Congress. British forces 
were actively participating in the first actions.  
 
Simultaneously, French President Jacques Chirac made a similar announcement, 
indicating that France’s military units will also be part of future operations, while all 
available logistic support and intelligence was already supplied.
3 Chirac spoke live on 
 
 This report, a cooperative effort, was written in the weeks immediately following the terrorist attacks on 
the United States.  You will not find definitive answers or conclusions in this report as it was impossible to 
adequately  predict the future of certain issues and events considering the proximity to the event itself, the 
grave impact throughout the world, and the general feeling of insecurity and unpredictability that 
permeated the air during that time.  This report, however, was meant to draw attention and provide an 
information source on issues that would need to be addressed and those that would be interesting to 
research in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and as you will see, many of the issues and concerns 
mentioned throughout this report are still top items on the European Union agenda. 
1 http://www.miami.com/herald/content/news/national/digdocs/003311.htm: 
http://www.miami.com/herald/content/news/world/digdocs/075146.htm 
2 http://www.miami.com/herald/content/news/world/digdocs/075146.htm 
 
3 http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3214--229546-,00.html; 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011009&xref=20011009elpepiint_14&type=Tes&anchor=elp
epiint 
  3   
French TV, with a background shaped by the French and the European Union flags, in a 
scene reminiscent of a similar announcement made in 1991, by then French President 
François Mitterrand, pledging France’s military support in the U.S.-led Persian Gulf War 
operation.
4  Germany and Russia gave unconditional backing, with President Putin 
making a remarkable effort in readdressing his country’s foreign policy in line with 
Europe’s security.
5 Spain, other EU member states, and other nations announced that 
military units could participate in future actions.
6 The European Union, through the office 
of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
reaffirmed the pledge of its 15-nation membership. The Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs announced the contribution of about $300 million destined to a UN fund for the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan.
7       
 
Well over four weeks after the attacks, European perceptions and actions were 
considered exemplary of solid support for the United States. Attitudes have been 
cautionary regarding the concrete measures (especially military) to be taken, while the 
leadership appeared to be politically supportive. Some individual figures have captured 
the spotlight for decisive opinions and more than possible actions (the case of the United 
Kingdom’s Prime Minister Tony Blair). Others appear to have caused controversies 
(Italy’s Berlusconi, for claiming the West’s “superiority”). Former statesmen, political 
analysts and intellectuals have engaged in a deep debate over the central issue (terrorism), 
the ways to address the threat, and the need for a long-term political and economic 
strategy in dealing with the world’s disparities.
8 While the political leadership seems to 
be unified in supporting the U.S. actions, minority political parties and organizations 
have vented pacifist views, questioning the retaliatory measures and forcing 
parliamentary debates.
9 
 
Regarding the collective role of the European Union, the signals have been mixed. 
Some currents of opinion and insiders, usually critical of the current state of the European 
Union in world affairs, have remained silent in view of the urgency of the situation. 
Others, instead of assuming an aggressive attitude that would contribute little to meet the 
demands of the crisis, have judged the performance of the institutions and leadership as 
complying with the prescribed role as set by the EU structure. Most optimists consider 
that, as in other times of crisis, international and internal, the European Union has 
accepted the lessons, with the result of taking one more step towards a deeper integration. 
At the same time, the strengths of the EU system have become more evident. European 
                                                 
4 http://www.elysee.fr/actus/actu_.php?AA=01&MM=10&JJ=07 
5 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14434-2001Oct5.html; 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2330-2001Oct3.html 
6http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011009&xref=20011009elpepiint_25&type=Tes&anchor=el
pepiint; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22957-2001Oct7.html; 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/09/international/europe/09EURO.html 
7http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011009&xref=20011009elpepiint_16&type=Tes&anchor=el
pepiint 
8http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011009&xref=20011009elpepiopi_9&type=Tes&anchor=elp
epiopi; http://www.lemonde.fr/dh/0,5987,3208--6214141,00.html 
9 http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3224--229825-,00.html 
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integration and the future of the European Union will depend to a certain extend on the 
evolution of the management of the crisis and how European leadership responds to the 
unpredictable course of events.
10 Most optimistic views consider that the U.S.-EU 
relationship will be reinforced in a compatibility framework regarding the state of world 
affairs, resulting in an increased role of the European Union in the international scene.
11    
  
 
A few days after the crisis, the European press and intellectuals began to engage in 
a deep debate about the background to the crisis, its consequences and dangers. The 
perception of the United States in Europe and the attitude that citizens and independent 
observers usually have of the U.S. foreign policy have propelled the crisis to the center of 
European preoccupations. European self-identity has been impacted by the crisis. 
    
  Recent history offers some significant examples for comparison as to how the  
European Union reacts to world events and grave developments. When the Iraqi 
government responded to the allies’ air bombardment during the Persian Gulf War with a 
desperate round of medium range missiles, the EU correspondent of a Spanish daily titled 
the repercussions of the crisis with this cryptic commentary: “A SCUD over Brussels”. It 
was like a missile fired afar from Baghdad had crashed against the emblematic 
Berlaymont building, house of the European Commission, ready to be vacated for the 
removal of asbestos. It was a fitting picture for the lack of preparedness of the otherwise 
powerful economic and social organization, but politically and militarily still in its 
infancy. More than a decade later, and depending on how new developments arise and 
how the European Union performs, there is the danger that an additional jetliner piloted 
by suicidal terrorists may have symbolically collided against the same Berlaymont, now 
ready to be reoccupied after a decade of renovation.  
 
The European Union seems to have learned much since then about engaging in 
political and military crisis. Its institutions have performed with accuracy and readiness, 
according to the script prescribed by recent treaties and their modifications. The words of 
Jean Monnet have been fulfilled – nothing is possible without men, but nothing is 
permanent without the  work of institutions.   
 
Yet, the European Union still has a long road to travel until it can present a 
common face (a “shared telephone,” as once demanded by Henry Kissinger). That was 
certainly true after the cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001. It is still too early to 
analyze how precisely the crisis has affected the European Union, how it has prompted its 
main institutions and most important members, and to predict what the consequences will 
be.  
 
 
This report attempts to fulfill many purposes:  
 
 to offer a reading of the impact of the crisis on the EU network  
                                                 
10 http://www.lemonde.fr/rech_art/0,5987,226229,00.html 
11 Francico Aldecoa Lurraga, “La Unión Europea, la otra Mirada,” La Clave, 28 set-4 octubre. 
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 to review and analyze the immediate response of the EU institutions and major 
leaders 
 to consider the potential consequences of the pivotal, criminal events of 
September 11, 2001, on the present and the future of the EU 
 to offer some predictions as to how the crisis and its evolution may affect not only 
the future actions of the Union, but the daily and permanent work of its main 
institutions. 
 
  Selectively, the report will make references to the role played by the most 
influential members states of the European Union, but the bulk of the commentary is 
reserved for the European Union as an entity, not as a conglomerate of its members. 
 
Based on the initial reactions and the most evident potential scenarios, the 
following items should be entertained: 
 
The European Union 
 
The European Union institutions and leaders have responded in unison condemning 
the attacks and expressing solidarity with the United States.
12 This European response has 
been at the forefront of the world support for the United State. 
13   The unprecedented 
European Council convened in Brussels on September 21, and culminated in a series of 
urgent declarations and special meetings of the Council of the European Union, the 
Commission and the European Parliament with an unequivocal pledge of EU support 
for the United States.
14 Reflecting a common sentiment of solidarity, the thirteen states 
negotiating for membership in the European Union, endorsed these declarations and other 
measures.
15 
  
Other Europe-wide organizations, such as the 43-member Council of Europe,
16 have 
acted in similar fashion. European media,
17 scholars, and  research institutions have 
responded with a high sense of responsibility condemning the attack, supporting the 
United States, while reflecting varied lines of opinion, and calls for justice and caution.
18 
                                                 
12 http://www.eurunion.org/partner/EUUSTerror/EURespUSTerror.htm 
13 Le Monde, September 21, “La coalition internationale se met en place.”  
http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3210--223167-,00.html 
14 http://www.eu2001.be/Main/Frameset.asp?reference=01-01&lang=en&sess=1003051897& 
15 http://www.eu2001.be/Main/Frameset.asp?reference=01-01&lang=en&sess=1003051897& 
16 http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actualite/article.asp?cat=4&th=0&ar=2612 
17For a sample of European views, see: Steven Erlanger, “In Europe, Some Say the Attacks Stemmed From 
American Failings”,  New York Times, September 22, 2001. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/22/international/europe/22DEBA.html?searchpv=past7days. T.R. 
Reid and William Drozdiak “Allies Express Solidarity and Caution: EU Leaders Back Bush, but Urge Care 
in Timing, Targeting of Retaliatory Military Strikes,” The Washington Post, September 22, 2001; Page 
A19. For a sample of the reaction in the European press, often critical of U.S. foreign policy, see the  
editorial of El País: 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20010922&xref=20010922elpepiopi_2&type=Tes&anchor
=elpepiopi 
18 Le Monde, September 22, “Les Quinze jugent "légitime" une riposte américaine qui serait "ciblée". 
http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3214--223261-,00.html 
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European leaders and independent observers have voiced an urgent need for institutional 
reform and legal cohesiveness to face the new crisis.
19  
 
Supranational or Intergovernmental?  
 
The fact that the first  European leaders to travel to Washington after the attacks on the 
World Trade Center were made first by France’s President Jacques Chirac
20 and second 
by the UK’s Prime Minister Tony Blair, who was invited to attend a joint session of 
Congress, shows an expected leading role of states as actors instead of an institutionally 
very complex supranational entity.  
 
The reality is that the European Union is still basically an intergovernmental 
entity as far as security is concerned. This profile was confirmed by the fact that when 
the European Commission President Romano Prodi and Belgian Prime Minister Guy 
Verhofstat met with President Bush on September 27,
21 after a whole week of visits of 
foreign leaders, the Washington press did not even mention the meeting.  
 
On the other hand, the spotlight was captured by Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi’s 
remarks on the “superiority” of the West over Islam.
22  EU high officials under the format 
of the “troika” were caught by surprise while traveling in the Arab region trying to obtain 
much needed support, expressing visible irritation towards the Italian Prime Minister’s 
remarks.
23 In an unprecedented press interview, EU External Relations Commissioner, a 
member of the “troika”, criticized Berlusconi’s opinions.
24 The controversy became the 
center of a “lively” –according to its own transcription- debate in the European 
Parliament, where former President Enrique Barón considered it “unacceptable to see the 
crisis as a clash of civilizations.”
25 The topic of the session was labeled as a “fall out from 
U.S. bombings” –a prediction of future events.  
 
In some countries with closer relations to the Muslim world (such as the case of 
Spain), the debate over Berlusconi’s opinions became the center of efforts to avoid 
                                                 
19 See commentary of Carlos Carnero, member of the European Parliament, “Respuesta europea”, Diario16, 
26 setiembre, http://www.diario16.es/ayer/2001/09/26/ 
20 President Chirac’s visit to Washington was already scheduled before the tragic events. The confirmation 
of his agenda served to reinforce France’s protagonism in European –US relations.  For declarations of the 
French leaders: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actual/dossiers/attentatsusa/declarations.html#1 
21 http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2001/2001072.htm 
22 http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3214--228306-,00.html; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A32420-2001Sep26.html 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/29/international/europe/29ROME.html?searchpv=nytToday 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/28/international/europe/28ITAL.html?searchpv=past7days 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43938-2001Sep29.html; 
http://www.time.com/time/europe/eu/magazine/0,9868,176876,00.html 
23http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?anchor=elpepiint&xref=20010928elpepiint_19&type=Tes&d_date=20
010928 
24http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011001&xref=20011001elpepiint_25&type=Tes&anchor=e
lpepiint 
25http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011002&xref=20011002elpepiint_25&type=Tes&anchor=e
lpepiint; http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/OM-Europarl?PROG=PRESS-DAILYNB&L=EN&PUBREF=-
//EP//TEXT+PRESS-DAILYNB+DN-20011001-1+0+DOC+SGML+V0//EN&LEVEL=1#SECTION3 
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prejudice.
26 In Italy, as a reflection that the words of the Primer Minister are not 
representative of a general view, a special Christian-Islamic summit was organized, with 
the active participation of Renato Ruggiero, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
27     
 
 Internal debate in the member states regarding the adequate European endorsement 
of the U.S. measures became evident as the days passed after the initial shock. France’s 
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin issued statements contrasting with Chirac’s unconditional 
support. However, the crisis became a considerable help for Mr. Chirac’s popularity, 
enhancing his chances for reelection in March 2002.
28 In Spain, different political and 
media sectors raised concern on the attitude of the Spanish government, opening a lively 
debate over the precise nature of Spain’s contribution (most especially with the use of the 
military bases).
29 
 
In the UK, the unconditional support given by Prime Minister Tony Blair to the 
United States became a subject of internal debate, among other reasons for being too 
“presidential,” although this did not translate into lack of solid support from the 
conservative opposition. British political leadership has remained united in considering 
the U.S. reaction as just, calling for proper military action if demands are not met. The 
British Prime Minister appeared to be a privileged receiver of U.S. intelligence on the 
authorship of the attacks.
30 In the event that only British armed forces participate directly 
in the military operations, the UK’s European specificity and its autonomous role in the 
EU context will be further emphasized, as illustrated by Blair’s solo trips to Russia, 
Pakistan, and India.
31 In an unprecedented procedure, the Prime Minister’s office released 
a 21-page document in which the evidence detailed left "absolutely no doubt that bin 
Laden and his network are responsible" for the attacks.
32 
 
The exceptional role of the British in handling this crisis has certainly made more 
obvious the different degrees of partnership between the United States and the rest of the 
NATO allies. As an example, the same documentation given to the UK government and 
placed by the Primer Minister on the web, was only verbally presented to other NATO 
                                                 
26 http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3210--229431-,00.html 
27 http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3210--229432-,00.html 
28 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/30/international/30FRAN.html 
29http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20010930&xref=20010930elpepiopi_13&type=Tes&anchor=e
lpepiopi; 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20010930&xref=20010930elpepiopi_12&type=Tes&anchor=el
pepiopi 
30 “Tony Blair aurait vu les preuves de l'implication d'Oussama Ben Laden”, Le Monde, 
September 30.  
http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3214--228384-,00.html; 
http://specials.ft.com/theresponse/FT3890ZM8SC.html; 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/01/international/europe/01BRIT.html?searchpv=nytToday; 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011002&xref=20011002elpepuint_3&type=Tes&anchor=elp
epupor 
31http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011001&xref=20011001elpepiint_4&type=Tes&anchor=el
pepiint; for periodic updates of the British government documents and press releases, see: 
http://www.pm.gov.uk/ 
32 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/05/international/05EVID.html 
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members (and EU Member States). The contrast was the object of a harsh debate in the 
Spanish Congress.
33        
   
In this confusing setting, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder took the lead in 
calling for European unity and stressing the role of the European Union in security 
cooperation.
34 “European nations must stop their squabbling and petty jealousies and 
unite to fight against terrorism,” he said. “Moreover, Europe's demonstration of solidarity 
with the United States in the wake of last month's attack had also underlined the role of 
the European Union as being beyond that of merely a free trade zone.” Correcting the 
prevalent wrong perception, “the EU is a political area committed to producing not only 
greater wealth but also greater security for all of its members." He also made an indirect 
comment on Berlusconi’s remarks, by rejecting that this was “a war between the 
Christian west and the less civilised east”. One month after the attacks, in the wake of a 
visit to Washington, the German Chancellor made an explicit declaration in the German 
Parliament regarding his interpretation on what the new foreign policy of the Federal 
Republic of Germany should be. First, he recognized that the reconstruction of Germany 
after the second World War was accomplished through international solidarity. As a 
consequence, and recognizing that international responsibility cannot avoid direct risks, 
he stressed that in the event of a request for military actions, Germany will respond 
affirmatively. However, future solutions to the crisis should go beyond mere military 
actions.
35          
 
Russia’s attitude towards NATO and the European Union appears to have changed 
dramatically. As a result of a series of meetings with U.S. officials, direct 
communications with President Bush, and a special trip by President Putin to Brussels, 
the former Cold War adversary pledged complete cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism, making Russia a partner and pivotal actor in European security.
36  
 
The diverse way in which Europe has been expressing its views on the crisis, and  the 
multiple formats utilized by the individual or collective leadership, have led observers to 
evaluate the performance in two complementary ways. On the one hand, optimists and 
legal-minded observers consider that individual countries and EU institutions have been 
very faithful to the spirit of the treaties and conventions. Each actor has played its role as 
prescribed by, and according to realistic expectations. On the other hand, pessimists and 
cynics have used the occasion to point out that “EU leaders appear to move in groups of 
three when visiting the Americans, who have to inspect the EU directory to see where 
                                                 
33http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011006&xref=20011006elpepiint_16&type=Tes&anchor=e
lpepiint 
34 Lucy Ward and Michael White, The Guardian, October 2, 2001, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,3605,561638,00.html 
35 Declaration at German Parliament, Berlin, October 11, 2001. 
36 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2528-2001Oct3.html; 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2330-2001Oct3.html: 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011004&xref=20011004elpepiopi_2&type=Tes&anchor=elp
epiopi 
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they fit and who is the most important. Meanwhile, leaders of the Member States travel 
on their own to demonstrate unified Europe’s solidarity".
37 
 
 Predicting a much needed and coordinated division of labor in the reconstruction of a 
fractured or collapsed Afghanistan, in which each actor may be called upon to perform in 
the proper area of expertise, France made a concrete proposal in the setting of the 
European Union. It includes the creation of a cadre de concertation permanente formed 
by the European Union, the United States, the neighboring states (including Russia), the 
UN agencies and the NGOs. The Plan d’Action would aim at several objectives: the 
insertion of the European Union in the management of the crisis beyond the military 
aspects; placing a solution to the crisis in a UN setting; coordination of Afghanistan’s 
future with its neighbors; and the recognition of the EU Commission as the best expert in 
the area of reconstruction assistance.
38 
    
 
The European Commission and the Council of the European Union 
 
The European Commission, with its once pivotal role already weakened by the 
evolution of the EU towards a more balanced entity between a supranational ambition 
and an inter-governmental reality, and the corresponding confirmation of the European 
Council as the hegemonic body, has acted according to its secondary role in political and 
security matters. It appears the Commission will be most efficient in administering the 
resources destined for reconstruction and development assistance.   
 
Once the European leadership (state- centered and institutional) made the initial 
statements of support for the United States, the “troika” format took the lead in effective 
diplomacy in the formation of a much-needed coalition to fight terrorism. Jean Louis 
Michel, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium (holding the EU presidency), Josep 
Piqué, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain (incoming presidency), External Relations 
Commissioner Chris Patten, and Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), embarked on a ten-day trip to the capitals of the 
main Islamic nations. The EU representation sent a triple message: the fight against 
terrorism is not directed against Islam, there is a need for curtailing the resources of 
terrorist organizations, and the European Union has a renewed disposition for bilateral 
relationships.
39  
 
Preliminary findings include warnings from the region regarding potential 
repercussions in Europe as a result of the retaliatory measures taken by the United 
States.
40 Overall, the troika’s conclusions regarding EU views and aims for the rest of the 
world are summarized this way: “We have just now launched a permanent process, in 
particular with this region. We have the will and the responsibility to continue and 
                                                 
37 Source: EU officer. 
38 http://www.lemonde.fr/rech_art/0,5987,228894,00.html 
39 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euromed_news/troika_09_01.htm 
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reinforce the dialogue we started this week. This capacity to listen to persuade, to discuss 
within mutual respect is an essential characteristic of European diplomacy.”
41   
 
Europe’s practical defense voice was heard most clearly as a bloc of allies in the 
declaration made by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO on September 12
th 
calling for the activation of article 5 of the Treaty of Washington.
42 However, when days 
passed, NATO’s officials (as well as EU sources) were not able to identify specific 
modalities for the proper implementation of this drastic NATO measure, regarding the 
contributions expected from the U.S. allies.
43  
 
Subsequently, in what appeared to be a formal preparation for military intervention, 
on Monday, October 1
st, the NAC activated the defense clause included in Art. 5, after 
reviewing evidence (considered as secret) presented by the United States.
44 
 
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
The crisis and its treatment by the EU structure will be yet another reason for its 
leadership to accelerate the unfinished status of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), the development of the Rapid Reaction Force, and the proper placement 
of the office of the High Representative for the CFSP. While in the NATO structure, the 
role of the Secretary General has a defined mandate, as it was shown in the Kosovo crisis, 
it is not clear how the high-level profile of Javier Solana (and his successors) will stand 
now in the institutional puzzle of the European Union.  Observers of the EU process may 
point out that the central question is not to what extent the Council will relinquish its 
powers over CFSP matters but rather to what degree foreign and security matters will 
become fully common competencies (thus reducing the possibility of individual member 
states vetoing decisions on CFSP).  
 
  As a consequence of the urgency, the EU ministers of defense have decided to 
speed up the process of implementing plans to make the Rapid Reaction Force 
(composed of 60,000 troops and an additional 120,000 reservists) operational by 
December 2001, well ahead of the initial goal of 2003.  A conference to be held in 
November will prepare final details to be approved at the European Council meeting in 
Laeken, Belgium, in December. 
     
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euromed_news/troika_09_01.htm 
42 http://www.nato.int/terrorism/index.htm#bt 
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44http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011002&xref=20011002elpepuint_2&type=Tes&anchor=el
pepupor; http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/02WIRE-NATO.html 
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Policies 
 
The immediate consequences of the crisis will have a serious impact on some of the 
central  community policies of the European Union, mostly in the areas of internal 
migration  (due to more strict security measures) and free movement of goods and 
services (caused by potential restrictions in transportation, mail systems, and banking 
processes).  
 
In a surprise move, and taking advantage of his leadership in supporting the U.S. 
cause, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that this was the moment for the U.K to 
adopt the euro, a decision to end partial isolationism from the rest of Europe in a time of 
crisis. Passed by Parliament or in a separate referendum, the adoption of the common 
currency would reinforce European monetary integration as no other previous measure 
taken in the financial field.
45  
 
Regarding security measures, the European Commission has proposed   
legislation to be implemented in all EU airports. It includes common procedures for 
luggage inspection, access to airport areas, passenger control, and employee 
identification.
46 
     
Economy 
 
Since the beginning of the crisis it has been difficult to provide a precise analysis of the 
impact of the crisis on the European economy
47 as a whole or in part of the European 
Union’s economic and financial policies.
48 Expert and media commentaries have shown 
the contrast between the centralized measures taken by the U.S. financial authorities and 
the diverse and cautious attitudes seen in European governments. Dramatizing the 
contrast, Le Monde termed the U.S. response as volontarisme and the European reaction 
as inhibition.
49    
 
At first, the EU structure reacted with a statement made by the European 
Central Bank expressing its confidence in the euro zone. The ECB feels confident the 
attacks will not significantly erode the euro zone growth projections and believes that the 
“slowdown in economic growth will be short-lived.”
50 However, the question remains 
whether this optimistic talk by key financial experts is just a way of reestablishing 
consumer and investor confidence. 
                                                 
45 http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4269945,00.html; 
http://www.iht.com/articles/34454.html 
46http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011006&xref=20011006elpepiint_21&type=Tes&anchor=e
lpepiint 
47 For an overall commentary made in the aftermath of the tragedy, see Center for European Policy Studies, 
Daniel Gros, http://www.ceps.be/Commentary/September01/danielwtccom.htm 
48 See reports on the ECOFIN meeting of September 21-22. 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20010922&xref=20010922elpepueco_1&type=Tes&anchor=elp
por. See appendix authored by Beatriz Danguillecourt. 
49 http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3208--229247-,00.html 
50 “ECB remains upbeat about growth and inflation” http://www.ft.com, 20 September 2001. 
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  In expectation of hard evidence, only comparative predictions made by financial 
institutions are available. The World Bank, for example, predicted that growth in the 
developed countries was supposed to decrease from 5.5% in 2000 to 2.9% in 2001, as a 
result of the slow down of the economy. It was expected that a 4.3% growth would be 
obtained in 2002. After the September 11 crisis, the World Band has lowered this 
estimate to between 0.5 and  0.75.
51 European governments have announced austerity 
measures in view of the perceived recession in the United States.
52 
 
Justice and Home Affairs 
 
It is predicted that the pressure to convert some of the competencies still included in the 
third pillar of the Union (justice and home affairs) into a part of the pooled sovereignty 
of the first pillar, might suffer a considerable delay. Among the prime candidates for this 
delay will be the entrance of new members in the Schengen agreements. Some countries, 
notably the UK, may opt for a hardening of border controls. In any case, European 
governments, pressed by their corresponding societies, will oscillate towards one of two 
tendencies. The first is the temptation to reinforce a “closed Europe” facing a danger; the 
second is the opposite, or an “inclusive Europe”, which will seek closer relations with 
countries that are not on the list of thirteen candidates, with an array of cooperation 
programs.
53 
 
On the positive side, cohesiveness and coherence in treating the threats of 
terrorism and organized crime will become more coordinated, and therefore, offer a 
better prospect for becoming fully supranational policies.
54 This is demonstrated by the 
decision taken by the Council of Ministers of Justice.
55 The crisis will call attention 
towards projects such as the European Union’s capability to deploy police forces in 
conflict areas, a closer judicial cooperation, cohesive mutual recognition in criminal law, 
and the establishment of a European Border Guard.
56 As a result of this need, Belgium, 
Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Finland will hold talks in Brussels on Oct. 15, 
“as part of a European Union effort to tighten security and safeguard the bloc's external 
borders before the enlargement of the union.”
57 
The troika’s conclusions included this assessment: “We have to address as soon as 
possible the task of defining what constitutes ‘terrorism’ or, to be more precise, what 
constitutes a terrorist act. As regards financing of terrorism we have to implement the 
Action Plan adopted last Friday. Several of our interlocutors have complained about a 
                                                 
51http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20011002&xref=20011002elpepiint_5&type=Tes&anchor=el
pepiint 
52 http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3222--228679-,00.html 
53 See CEPS’s report. 
54 Se Joanna Apap, http://www.ceps.be/Commentary/September01/terrorism.htm 
55 http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3222--223061-,00.html 
56 CEPS’ report. 
57 http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/07/international/europe/07BORD.html?searchpv=nytToday 
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lack of cooperation from EU countries in this field. We have to take measures as soon as 
possible to forestall such criticism.”
58  
Enlargement 
 
Enlargement  plans may suffer a delay in some cases, especially with countries still 
under the scrutiny of the European Union due to some sensitive details (lack of complete 
democratic credentials, a majority of Islamic population, etc.). In other cases, under the 
pressure of the urgency presented by the crisis, the European Union  may resolve to close 
negotiations with the countries best prepared for membership and complete a first round 
of expansion on a schedule according to the most optimistic views. The explicit or 
potential candidacies of Cyprus and some of the former Yugoslavia new republics may 
suffer a considerable delay. Although standard strict requirements have made Turkey’s 
candidacy a permanent problem, its case may be pushed to the front of the agenda to 
anchor this pivotal country in a Europe in need of secure borders.  
 
Relations with the Mediterranean and Middle East 
 
Relations with some Middle Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries may 
become more strained due to security constraints. Yet, the troika’s conclusions included 
these unequivocal statements: “The mission has been very well received in every one of 
the countries we visited. This visit was first and foremost a political symbol: the 
European Union extended its hand to the Arab and Muslim world. This was well 
understood by our interlocutors.”
59  There is no way to know if the EU’s influence in the 
Palestine/Israel confrontation will be reinforced or weakened, depending on the course of 
events. The crisis may offer an opportunity for a more coordinated EU-U.S. policy 
toward the region.  
 
EU-U.S. Relations 
 
Across the Atlantic, relations with the main protagonist and victim of the attacks will be 
reinforced or strained, depending on the actions taken by the United States and the 
perception that the European states may have. Much will depend on the degree to which 
the United States acts collegially and engages in real consultations with its NATO allies 
before undertaking actions involving the use of force.  
 
The troika’s conclusions include these statements: “Our message to the United 
States is that only a multilateral approach can reinforce their security, can guarantee ours. 
We will also deliver the message to them that it is important to take into account different 
public opinions. Everywhere there is the willingness to combat terrorism. But also the 
fear exists that potential disproportionate actions could lead to the loss of support of these 
public opinions, with the risks of destabilization this entails.”
60  
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From the point of view of cultural relations, the crisis and its uncertain 
development may represent a milestone in the perception and image of the United 
States in Europe. The traditional gap between the critical view from the left and the 
more admiring attitude from the right was temporarily suspended in the aftermath of the 
tragedy, but it may be resurrected in a new fashion depending on the actions of the 
United States. The subtle distinction between what is considered “American”, and what is 
judged as “universal” or “western” culture may be redefined once the European public is 
forced to decide if the attack was against the United States alone or against all signs of 
civilization. In the event that US retaliatory actions seem to be judged as 
disproportionate, especially if military confrontation leads to grave chaos and unbearable 
losses, European perception may lean toward an interpretation that the attack was 
targeted solely on the United States, and not on western civilization.  
 
  Representative of European perceptions, French views of the United States are 
positive, showing over 70% support for the U.S. However, while memories of American 
losses in freeing France from German occupation have a permanent spot in French 
gratitude, a substantial majority still  feels apprehension towards the way the U.S. 
leadership may handle the crisis. A report in the New York Times very aptly 
summarized this attitude: “France and America have long vied with one another to be 
seen as the true guardian of the free world. France's aspirations for its culture breed a 
resistance to American imports. In addition, a host of social and political issues have 
begun to come between the two countries, from America's support of capital punishment 
to a general sense that Americans are too concerned with money, unable to enjoy life or 
to reach out to those who have less than they do. Nowhere has resistance to what is 
portrayed as an American-led attempt to impose its culture and economic model on the 
world been stronger.”
61 
     
Americas 
 
As a collateral damage of the September 11 events, regional integration schemes in the 
Americas will suffer some impact, especially in the areas of migration and resistance to 
common institutions that are perceived to weaken the role of the autonomous state.  
 
 
All medium and long range plans for regional integration seemed to be placed in a 
holding pattern after the attacks.
62 The U.S. government was not pleased by the 
ambivalent reaction coming from Latin America, expecting more than standard 
declarations of solidarity.
63 Although some observers considered it as an overreaction, the 
perception that the United States may further delay priorities for free trade pacts with its 
neighbors may provide opportunities for closer relations between Latin America and 
Europe. However, it remains to be seen how the European Union will be ready to offer 
Latin America a better deal than the one already on the negotiating table before the crisis.       
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NAFTA will witness a delay in consideration of the request made by Mexico’s 
President Vicente Fox for a more relaxed immigration policy. In view of the fact that the 
U.S. perception of the Mexican reaction to the attacks was not positive,
64 a weakening of 
the NAFTA link may advise Mexico of a closer relationship with the European Union, 
especially in the wake of the EU-Mexico free trade agreement. 
 
In the MERCOSUR context, the crisis may have a double effect. On the one hand, 
EU-MERCOSUR discussions are advanced and not directly affected by the aftermath of 
the tragedy. On the other hand, if the European model oscillates more heavily towards an 
intergovernmental model, MERCOSUR will lose all inspiration. If the crisis widens the 
gap with the United States, because Argentina and Brazil decide to distance themselves 
from the United States, or this country has to decide to concentrate its energies in hot 
regions of the world, the MERCOSUR bloc may opt for closer relations with the 
European Union. In any event, the economic crisis led to the abandonment of the already 
unsustainable Common External Tariff, resulting in the momentary retreat of 
MERCOSUR from a customs union agreement. This negative factor, added to the 
growing disharmony between Argentina and Brazil, might make negotiations with the 
European Union more difficult. 
 
 As will happen elsewhere, on the positive side, a more effective policy in combating 
narcotrafficking and terrorism will contribute to make some areas of the Americas 
more secure. On the other hand, observers also point out that drastic security measures 
may result in a strengthening of authoritarianism and collateral violation of human rights. 
It remains to be seen how the cooperation assistance programs of the European Union 
will be affected once a new trend of hard line regimes becomes the norm. With the EU 
assistance in the 80s as a reference, the new threat may pose a different challenge than 
confronting the U.S. Cold War perception of the region at that time.         
 
In general, but especially in the areas well outside of the most predictable scenarios 
for military confrontation, a considerable amount of EU economic and relief resources 
can be expected to be deployed once a possible needed reconstruction program is put in 
place. Optimistic views in Brussels consider that existing or forthcoming development 
assistance programs and budget line appropriations will remain independent of financing 
needs possibly emerging to cover reconstruction/rehabilitation in other parts of the world 
affected by military action or as a compensation for co-operation. The sudden shift in 
world needs may constitute the first major challenge for the performance of Europe-Aid, 
the newly born EU agency within the European Commission destined to centralize all 
assistance efforts. However, this expected EU humanitarian reaction may consequently 
have an impact on programs designed for other regions of the world. Of all areas, Latin 
America and the Caribbean stand to be the most obvious losers in receiving aid. Trade 
privileges and economic pacts may suffer the consequences of the pressure to shift the 
energies towards the Eastern border of Europe and the Southern Mediterranean shore. 
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Yet, optimistic voices in the EU institutions expect that this task of assistance and 
reconstruction will be taken on by  United Nations operations.  
  17   
EU Enlargement- What’s Next after September 11 Crisis 
 
-Gabriela Marin Thornton
65 
 
Before the September 11 crisis, the most common questions in regard to the enlargement 
process were: Can enlargement be made to work? And if so when? What candidate 
countries would join first, or second, or even third and on what dates? Will the Treaty of 
Nice be ratified by each member state of the European Union? The terrorist attack against 
the United States on September 11, did not wipe off those questions, of course. However, 
it prompted scholars and policy makers to ask a new question. Namely, how is  the 
September 11 crisis going to impact the EU expansion? The European Council met in 
Brussels in an extraordinary session on 21 September 2001. The conclusions of this 
session were presented under four headings: 1.solidarity and cooperation with the United 
States; 2. the European policy to combat terrorism; 3. the Union’s involvement in the 
world; and, 4. world economic prospects.
66 The Belgian Presidency asked the candidate 
states whether or not they agreed to align themselves with the conclusions of the 
extraordinary session. Thirteen candidate states immediately responded “yes”. “Acting 
together” (member states and candidate countries) adds a positive note to the enlargement 
process. However, caution should be exercised in making any connection with the 
enlargement process, since ultimately “acting together” does not mean necessarily, for 
the candidate countries, an easy or a rapid way of joining the Union.  
 
On the one hand, it could be argued that the conclusions of the Extraordinary 
European Council, which require enhancing police and judicial cooperation, developing 
international legal instruments to combat terrorism, putting an end to the funding of 
terrorism and strengthening air security, might be followed by certain modifications of 
the Acquis Communitaire, which consequently will delay the enlargement process. This 
perspective might be reinforced by a possible slow down in economic activities due to the 
September 11 crisis. On the other hand, claims could be made that these tragic events 
would give way to a more harmonious, if not even quicker, enlargement process. On 
September 13, Gunter Verheugen, the European Commissioner in charge of  enlargement 
declared: “the recent attacks in the US will have an impact on European integration and 
on the enlargement process. But this impact will be positive, as the feeling that we, 
Europeans, share the same values is more tangible than ever.”
67 It remains an open 
question if the Commission could use statements like this in member states to make to a 
                                                 
65 Ph. D. Candidate. University of Miami. 
66See Conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council. Press Release at 
http://www.eu2001.be/VE_Adv_Press  
67See Enlargement Weekly, September 14, 2001 at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter  
 
 
 
  18   
stronger case for the enlargement. Caution again should be exercised in jumping to any 
conclusions.  
 
Arguably a couple of factors will influence the enlargement process after the 
September 11 crisis. First, issues of justice and home affairs would start to move toward 
the top of the enlargement agenda. Action is to be expected from the Union in enforcing 
more than ever its present and future borders. If this move does occur, the image of 
Europe as a “fortress” could be reinforced, and the Union risks antagonizing its relations 
with neighboring states. Second, economic factors and border security issues could be 
used in order to replace the most common idea of two or three Eastern waves of 
enlargement with maybe four waves or more, delaying certain candidate countries, while 
speeding the accession of others.   
  19   
Enlargement 
 
-Nouray Ibryamova.
68 
 
That the world will never be the same after the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington on September 11 has become a cliché.  Inevitably, the aftershocks of the 
attacks have prompted a wave of readjustments in Europe, with implications for its long-
term agenda. 
 
It is to be expected that enlargement, the European Union’s major project of 
historical proportions, has been put on the backburner for the time being.  Inevitably, the 
newly approved measures for combating terrorism within the Union as well as the 
economic slowdown will impact the pace of the accession negotiations and perhaps even 
spark a debate on the accession dates of the best-prepared candidates.
69  What is more 
important, perhaps, is where the enlargement will stop, in other words, where the new 
fault line of the continent will run and what consequences can be expected. 
 
The Union and its member states alike have repeatedly pointed out that the fight 
against terrorism should not be viewed as a “clash of civilizations,” or as one pitting 
Christianity against Islam.  Much like the current member states, a number of the 
applicants for membership have sizeable Muslim populations and even terrorist cells 
established in their territories.  Turkey is the only candidate country with a predominantly 
Muslim population, but due to its checkered democratic credentials it has not yet opened 
accession negotiations.  Since the attacks, Turkey has found itself on the front lines of the 
fight against terrorism and its strategic importance has grown considerably.  Putting the 
often faltering EU-Turkey relations on the right track bears upon a number of issues 
ranging from Turkey’s veto power over the use of NATO assets by the Union’s Rapid 
Reaction Force to being the ultimate test of the European Union’s rejection of the “clash 
of civilizations,” while at the same time affirming its commitment to genuine democracy 
and liberal values.
70  Without turning a blind eye to Turkey’s record on human rights and 
democratic consolidation, the resolution of this impasse will indicate the EU’s 
commitment to a candidate, whose “Europeanness” at times seems to depend upon the 
presence of pressing security concerns.
71  
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The fledgling democracies of the former Yugoslavia – with the exception of 
Slovenia - to whom the Union has signaled the possibility of membership in the future, 
can suffer varying degrees of instability prompted by the U.S. and the EU shifting 
attention to the urgency of counter-terrorism.  Hence, the message that the European 
Union will send to various countries on the periphery of European integration is likely to 
affect the stability and security of the region as well as of Europe as a whole.
72 
 
The differences between the applicants who are likely to be included in the first 
round of enlargement and the rest, and particularly the non-applicant countries, are 
becoming increasingly visible.  From the periphery, the promised “common European 
home” does not seem very welcoming.  The increasingly restrictive nature of 
immigration and asylum policies
73 add to the feeling of exclusion and to more tangible 
social and economic disruptions along the Union’s external borders.  Emphasizing the 
irreversibility of enlargement as well as enhancing the cooperation with non-applicant 
states could in the long-run do more for Europe’s security than creating a virtual 
“Fortress Europe.” The terrorist attacks of September 11
th may prove to be a pivotal event 
for European integration,
74 expressed not only in the development of common policies on 
combating terrorism and cross-border crime, but also in emphasizing the urgency of 
enlargement.
75   
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The Economy 
 
-Beatriz Danguillecourt
76 
 
Europe has started to feel the economic impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The major indexes in European stock markets 
had fallen sharply by Thursday, September 20. The Frankfurt’s Xetra Dax fell 18.1 
percent, the Paris CAC index 14.3 percent, and the London FTSE was down 9.5 percent. 
European experts feel that the U.S. economy will have to show signs of recovery before 
Europe can turn around its markets. As an immediate effect of the crisis, layoffs in the 
airline industry have started. The big test on the economy will continue to unfold in the 
next weeks. The uncertainty of possible new terrorist attacks, and the U.S. military 
response to terrorism are keeping consumer confidence shaky. If job layoffs continue, 
bigger drops in the stock market are likely to materialize along with decreased consumer 
spending. An overall slowdown in economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic will 
become increasingly evident, and the threat of a long-term world recession will become 
imminent. Still, most experts believe that a major recession is not foreseen.  
The economic impact of the tragic events of September 11 has shaken momentarily 
the economic stability of the United States and the world. Because of the 
interconnectivity of the global markets, events in the United States created immediate 
repercussions in Europe. The European Union responded in unison with a statement from 
the European Central Bank expressing its confidence in the euro zone. The ECB felt 
confident the attacks would not erode the euro zone growth projections and believed that 
the “slowdown in economic growth will be short-lived.”
77 Also, in a concerted effort with 
the U.S. Federal Reserve bank, the ECB cut interest rates from 4.25 to 3.75 after the 
attacks. Despite the reassuring words of the ECB, the EU economic growth had to be 
revised at the end of the week. Pedro Solbes, Commissioner for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs, expects growth to be below 2 percent for the euro zone. Major indexes in 
European stocks fell sharply. There were also expectations that the Euro would rally 
against the dollar, but the euro’s behavior has been quite disappointing, with major 
changes in the exchange rate (either way in favor of the dollar or the euro) not expected.
78 
The day of the attacks the euro was trading at $0.891, and two weeks later it had only 
gained about four cents to the dollar. Nonetheless, European financial experts expect only 
a short-term recession, thus expressing confidence in the European economy and in the 
flexibility of EMU to combat the impact of the initial shock. 
Prior to the attacks, the U.S. and the global economy had already shown signs of 
recession. The IMF in the World Economic Outlook surveys had adjusted the world 
growth levels. Global growth was expected to be 0.6 percent lower than reported in May 
2001. U.S. growth was projected 0.2 percent lower than in May. For the euro area it had 
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been reduced by 0.6 percent.
79 At the same time, the latest European Commission report 
published on October 1
st showed that the economic confidence in the euro zone was at its 
lowest level, even before the September 11 attacks.
80  But the crisis has affected the 
tourism and air transportation industries. Already troubled companies such as Swiss Air 
and Sabena had government emergency funding injected to be able to continue 
operations.  
With the institutionalization of economic and monetary policy, Europe had in place 
the mechanisms needed to absorb the economic shock of the terrorist attacks. Ten years 
ago, during the Gulf War, it was unable to deliver a coordinated monetary policy. The 
institutionalization of the euro as a unique currency has protected European countries 
from monetary fluctuations. The September 21-22 meeting of the European Finance 
ministers (ECOFIN) reinforced the commitment to European monetary policies stating 
that they “must stick to the stability and growth pact,” with policies oriented to budget 
consolidation, and emphasis on structural reforms
81. In the meeting, they reaffirmed their 
commitment to its current policies. There is consensus among the EU officials that the 
guidelines established by the Maastricht Treaty in conjunction with the 1997 Growth and 
Stability Pact – which sets targets for the ratio between deficits and GNP- have enough 
flexibility to allow for larger deficits due to expectations of slower growth.
82 The EU 
Council supported the measures taken by the ECB as sufficient to combat the crisis. 
As a result of the events, the world economy might become more integrated. Didier 
Reynder, the Belgian Finance minister, predicts changes in global economic governance 
will occur, with countries around the world engaging in higher levels of cooperation, and 
institutionalizing tighter regulation in specific policies.
83 The Federal Reserve Chairman 
also predicted that the attacks would encourage countries to agree on a new round of free 
trade agreements resulting in a “stronger global market system.”
84 Finally, the EU issued 
a statement about the economic impact of the events, which expressed the need to 
reinforce closer international and transatlantic financial cooperation in economic matters, 
as well as within the economic policies of the Union.
85 
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The Impact of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks on US-Mexican Relations 
 
-Roberto Domínguez
86 
 
A week before the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, political commentators 
said that the relationship between Mexico and the United States was at one of the best 
levels of communication in their mutual history. 
 
Some specific facts can be considered as proof of the “new understanding” 
between the two countries. On the one hand, President’s Bush first trip abroad was to 
Mexico, and the trip included a stop at the hometown of Vicente Fox. Subsequently, few 
days before September 11
th, Fox was the first foreign president to pay a state visit to the 
United States. Less symbolically and more pragmatically, the traditional complex multi-
thematic bilateral agenda focused on proposals to increase legal entries of Mexicans; to 
legalize many undocumented Mexicans already in the U.S.; to create a new and expanded 
guest-worker program; and the possibility of a shared border-control program. In fact, 
Fox challenged Bush to conclude an immigration deal by the end of this year.
87  
  
With regard to hemispheric issues, Mexico proposed at the  Organization of 
American States (OAS) to redesign the Treaty of Rio because it considered that this 
security framework was obsolete for the post-Cold War order. In addition, Mexico 
announced its proposal to open a debate in order to decide the possibility of withdrawing 
from the treaty within 60 days.  
 
After the events of September 11
th, the bilateral relationship has changed in several 
aspects: 
 
 The redefinition of security policies in the U.S. implies stronger measures along 
territorial borders and, in consequence, stricter surveillance on migration issues. 
Officials of both countries have recognized that the probability of reaching an 
agreement with Mexico has been  postponed at least in the short term. 
 
 There is a readjustment in the political speech of the President of the United 
States. Prior to the tragic events, the relations with Mexico were seen as a priority; 
under the new circumstances, there is a return to traditional allies, particularly the 
United Kingdom.   
 
 A diplomatic disagreement emerged between Argentina and Brazil. Whereas both 
countries called for the Treaty of Rio in order to face the events of September 11
th 
on a regional level, Mexico preferred the diplomatic arena within the OAS.  After 
a meeting of the OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs (convened by Mexico), the 
proposal of Brazil and Argentina was accepted and the Treaty of Rio was 
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implemented. Despite this success of South American diplomacy, the meetings 
regarding the Treaty of Rio have had a low profile. 
 
 Mexico has presented its condolences to the United States and has offered its 
cooperation in providing information and political and diplomatic support in 
international forums. Even though the Mexican government has rejected any 
military participation, public opinion, representatives and intellectuals have 
questioned the support offered by the Mexican government.
88 Particularly, a target 
of criticism has been the Foreign Affairs Minister since he mentioned that “the 
U.S. has every right and reason to seek revenge, we cannot deny them support”. 
The international media
89 has also pointed out that Mexico’s support should be 
deeper. 
 
It remains to be seen how the changes in U.S.-Mexican relations will offer opportunities 
or pose obstacles for better prospects of the EU-Mexico free trade agreement.    
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MERCOSUR 
 
-Manuela Picq
90 
 
In the last months, the menace of economic recession was dangerously hanging over 
Latin America. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, it became a concrete and 
potentially longstanding reality. The attacks on the United States had undeniable 
economic and political repercussions at the international level, especially on its regional 
partners, such as MERCOSUR.  
 
  As Wall Street remained closed for four days, the attacks shattered not only 
American, but also global financial markets. The recession might not have been as bad as 
expected, but the slow down of economic activity had inevitable impacts in Latin 
America. As MERCOSUR was desperately looking for foreign investment, it 
instantaneously suffered from the blockage and slowdown of trade. Capital flows also 
drastically diminished as fears of a global recession increased, and left even fewer hopes 
for growth in a region already on the decline. Thus, the attacks on the U.S. meant snail-
pace economic growth in MERCOSUR, and, at worst, economic collapses in the near 
future.
91 Politically, the economic crisis led to the abandonment of the already 
unsustainable Common External Tariff, or, in other words, the momentary retreat of 
MERCOSUR from a customs union agreement. 
 
The terrorist attacks thus had important consequences on the political stability of 
MERCOSUR, and endangered a regional demobilization. Brazil reacted to the crisis by 
urging the activation of the Rio Pact.
92  But in Argentina, the response was to lean more 
than ever toward preferential agreements with the United States. The attacks thus 
reinforced sectors of the Argentinean society that want to leave MERCOSUR to build a 
commercial and military alliance with the United States, coming back to the so-called 
“carnal relations.”
93 
The ongoing bilateral negotiations between MERCOSUR and the European 
Union were not considerably affected by the September 11 crisis. A meeting planned to 
discuss tariffs on the automotive sector had to be postponed as the Frankfurt Car Show, 
where it was scheduled to take place, was cancelled in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks. The EU-MERCOSUR agenda remains nevertheless unchanged in its form and 
content. Indeed, MERCOSUR leaders have already confirmed the presentation of a 
counter-proposal for the EU tariff offer before October 31
st date agreed upon for the next 
Biregional Negotiation Committee meeting, and both parties have committed themselves 
to maintain the pace of the negotiation process. If the terrorist attacks had any impact at 
all on EU-MERCOSUR relations, it was on the economic, and by extension political, 
destabilization of MERCOSUR itself. Indeed, the growing disharmony between 
Argentina and Brazil might make common negotiations more difficult, and the EU 
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Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy will have even more trouble finding a counterpart 
able to guide the process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  27   
Despite 9/11 Terrorist Attacks, Life goes on in the European Union 
 
 
-Aimee Kanner
94 
 
 
The recent terrorist attacks against the United States and the inexplicable spread of 
anthrax are high on the minds of European Union officials and staff.  During a recent 
Information Program sponsored by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Brussels, a U.S. 
delegation was often thanked for making the Transatlantic journey, EU officials vowed to 
continue traveling to the United States for EU-U.S. business negotiations on various 
topics, claiming, “We must go on!” and reports of additional anthrax cases in New York 
and Washington, D.C. seeped into seminar rooms.  While terrorism and the ongoing war 
in Afghanistan are certainly hot topics in the European Union, and all issues and 
competencies are affected by the events of September 11 in some way or another, the 
march for progress continues on in the European Union.  The airline industry, Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, economy, and trade are just four examples to show that the 
9/11 events have affected various issue areas in many different ways, and that the 
flexibility of the European Union in dealing with these issues in a timely fashion and as a 
single unit will directly reflect on the possibilities for success.  
 
Airline Industry 
One of the industries that has been directly affected by the events of September 11, for 
obvious reasons, is the airline industry.  It is fair to say that all of the EU institutions have 
had to place this issue higher on their agendas because of the urgency of the situation.  
The European Commission has allowed member states to adopt certain emergency 
measures to assist airlines with the losses they suffered due to closure of American 
airspace for four days, with the increased security measures they needed to implement 
immediately following the attacks, and with providing adequate insurance so airplanes 
were not grounded for lack of the same.  
 
However, carriers from third countries as well as some EU member states claim 
that this is an unfair advantage for the airlines receiving subsidies, many of which were in 
jeopardy even before the events of September 11.  For example, the German Minister of 
Transportation, Kurt Bodewig claims that, “It is not acceptable that state subsidies in 
other countries breathe life back into ailing airlines, while the economically healthy 
German companies are disadvantaged.”
95  This is not to mention that U.S. carriers have 
been able to attract travelers by lowering Transatlantic prices while tickets on most 
European carriers have remained relatively high.  
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These valid complaints and risk of disputes in the World Trade Organization has 
forced the European Commission to put limits on the subsidies and emergency aid, 
limiting insurance assistance to one month and subsidies to the end of the year.  Although 
this has caused alarm for some of the ailing European airlines, the Commission has 
pledged to work towards a common solution to this problem. Loyola de Palacio, 
European Commissioner for transport and energy claimed, “The European Commission 
is aware of the serious problems facing European airlines and intends to take all 
appropriate measures.  But it must be in a common framework.  The range of options 
presented today will permit a concerted response by all European states, precluding any 
discrimination between airlines.”
96  It will certainly be interesting to see how this issue 
plays out considering the threat of future attacks continues to discourage would-be 
passengers, and there exists an uncommon dynamic between the industries in individual 
member states, the goals of the European Union, and free trade competition policies. 
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks the European Union declared its common 
position, claiming it would maintain a strong solidarity with the United States, increase 
security of air and other modes of transportation, and make obvious its determination to 
fight terrorism by increasing cooperation between police forces of the member states and 
those of third countries, especially the United States.  The second pillar of the European 
Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, has been unable, however to act as 
many would have hoped in such a crisis situation.  For example, military cooperation 
between the United States and EU member states has been conducted mainly on a 
bilateral basis as can be seen by the presence of British troops in Afghanistan while other 
EU member states, such as France and Germany, have offered to send military personnel 
if requested to do so by the alliance currently fighting the battle in the Middle East, and 
still others have been reluctant to make any commitments regarding military assistance in 
this Operation Enduring Freedom.   
 
These unilateral actions demonstrate the holes that still exist in the second pillar 
of the European Union and how this competency has not yet been fully developed.  This 
does not mean  that there is no hope for the future.  All things considered, the economic 
competency did not become fully developed overnight, and foreign and security policy, 
to a large extent, is a more sensitive subject.  The events of September 11 are pushing the 
CFSP forward, as member states may be starting to realize as they did with economic 
issues, that working together is more advantageous and less costly not only for each 
individual member state but for the European Union as a whole. 
 
 
                                                 
96 European Commission, “Terrorist attacks: emergency measures for air transport,” DN: IP/01/1399, 10 
October 2001. 
  29   
Economy 
The economy of the European Union is, without a doubt, suffering as a result of the 
September 11 attacks, and the economic downturn of the United States, one of the 
Union’s most important trading partners.  However, EU officials claim to have complete 
confidence in economic recovery for the region. “[The European Council] noted that the 
economic slowdown has been accentuated by these events but expressed its confidence 
that the sound economic fundamentals of the Union and the fiscal consolidation already 
achieved will help to ensure that the impact will be limited and temporary.”
97  However, 
the long term economic project of inaugurating the euro on January 1, 2002, seems to be 
right on track.  In fact, EU officials are quite confident that on December 31, 2001, ATM 
machines will start dispersing euros for public use the following day, and that although 
national currencies can be exchanged indefinitely, by March 1, 2002, the euro will be the 
only legal tender in the countries participating in this common currency initiative.   
 
Trade 
From November 9-13, 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministers meeting 
will be held in Doha, Qatar.  Only one week ago, the meeting was in question due to 
security concerns but after the United States committed to attend, many other WTO 
members seemed to come around to the idea as well.  After the WTO disaster in Seattle,  
this organization can not afford another such failure, and it is hoped that the events of 
September 11 will actually serve to promote cooperation at the November meeting.   It is 
thought that the 9/11 crisis will encourage countries, especially the United States and the 
European Union, to compromise to a greater extent as they believe it is important for 
international cooperation to function during this period of fighting against the so-called 
non-state enemy, and that the launch of a new round of negotiations will be possible by 
the conclusion of the ministerial meeting.  At the same time, however, the EU and U.S. 
cannot agree on all of the issues and have continuing disagreements over implementation, 
anti-dumping, investment and competition policy, intellectual  rights, and public health.  
Labor standards and environmental issues are so controversial that they are likely to 
remain far from the Doha discussions for it is very clear that at this point progress cannot 
be made if these issues are part of the negotiating agenda.  The need for members of the 
WTO to be seen as doing something positive on the international level following the 
terrorist attacks will inevitably be apparent in the results of this ministerial meeting. 
 
Conclusion 
Every individual, organization, industry, and government has been affected by the 
terrorist attacks against the United States on Tuesday, September 11, 2001.  The 
subsequent War Against Terror has not made the situation any easier.  It would be 
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irresponsible to deny the overwhelming economic, social, and political ramifications of 
this dastardly act anywhere in the civilized world, including the European Union.  In fact, 
just a small sample of the ways in which the European Union has been affected by these 
events has been outlined above.  In some cases, however, it appears as though the 
European Union is using the need to change focus in some issue areas to progress and 
achieve previous goals of deeper integration. 
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